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WHAT ABOUT SMALL BUSINESSES? THE
GDPR AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR SMALL,
U.S.-BASED COMPANIES
ABSTRACT
Fast-approaching changes to European data privacy law will have
consequences around the globe. Historically, despite having dramatically
different approaches to data privacy and data protection, the European
Union and the United States developed a framework to ensure that the highspeed freeway that is transatlantic data transfer moved uninterrupted. That
framework was overturned in the wake of revelations regarding U.S.
surveillance practices, and amidst skepticism that the United States did not
adequately protect personal data. Further, the European Union enacted the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), a sweeping overhaul of the
legal data protection landscape that will take effect in May 2018. The law
will impact all companies that process data relating to EU citizens, which
will include many U.S.-based ventures, big and small. And while many of the
world’s large technology companies will have feasible methods of quickly
complying with the law, small ventures will not have it so easy. This Note
explores the legal landscape of data privacy, discusses what led to the
current dynamic between the European Union and the United States, and
explains why the current methods for small, U.S.-based ventures attempting
to comply with the GDPR are not operationally feasible. This Note then
proposes both a short-term and long-term solution to address the significant
challenge that small companies in the United States currently face.
INTRODUCTION
Edward Snowden’s unveiling of the extent and scope of U.S. surveillance
practices caused economic ripples that continue to emanate today. 1
Globalization and the rise of the internet ushered in a new era in which data
is collected at an unprecedented pace and transferred all over the globe on a
daily basis. Julie Brill, former Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
Commissioner, put it best when she said “[t]he Internet has become today’s
global trade route, and personal data is one of its major currencies.” 2 Indeed,
the sheer volume of data that is collected and processed in today’s economy

1. See Klint Finley, Thank (Or Blame) Snowden for Europe’s Big Privacy Ruling, WIRED (Oct.
6, 2015, 9:06 PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/10/tech-companies-can-blame-snowden-dataprivacy-decision/ (explaining that the overruling of Safe Harbor, which occurred in response to
arguments relying on information about the NSA’s practices leaked by Snowden in 2013, would
create headaches for U.S. technology companies).
2. Julie Brill, Strengthening International Ties Can Support Increased Convergence of Privacy
Regimes, 2 EUR. DATA PROTECTION L. REV. 151, 151 (2016).
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is remarkable. 3 While this trend has created growth opportunities for private
enterprises, it has also created new risks in the areas of privacy and
cybersecurity.
No event shed more light on these new risks than Edward Snowden’s
revelations regarding the National Security Agency’s (NSA) surveillance
practices. 4 American data protection laws came under increased scrutiny as
an immediate result of Snowden’s actions. 5 Around the world, and
particularly in Europe, an attitude that perhaps the United States was not
adequately protecting consumers’ data privacy became commonplace. 6 This
movement culminated in a 2015 decision by the European Court of Justice
(CJEU) that invalidated the Safe Harbor Framework (Safe Harbor) between
the United States and the European Union. 7 Previously, companies in the
United States relied on Safe Harbor to lawfully transfer the personal data of
EU citizens to the United States. Safe Harbor was necessary under EU data
protection law because EU officials deemed the data protection laws of the
United States to be inadequate. 8 Without Safe Harbor, companies based in
the United States are in need of a new legal solution for transatlantic data
transfer.
Meanwhile, Europe was busy creating a new data protection framework
of its own. 9 After four years of deliberation, the European Union adopted the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) as its new data protection law. 10
The GDPR, set to go into effect in 2018, will replace the current EU data
privacy law and apply directly in each member state. 11 The GDPR will
provide a unified body of data protection law and a more harmonized
administration, 12 while also introducing an entirely new set of obligations for
companies looking to transfer personal data outside of the European Union. 13

3. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING
VALUES 4 (2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy
_report_may_1_2014.pdf.
4. See Finley, supra note 1.
5. See Courtney M. Bowman, US-EU Safe Harbor Invalidated: What Now?, THE NAT’L L.
REV. (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/us-eu-safe-harbor-invalidated-whatnow.
6. See Angelique Carson, Safe Harbor-Compliant Companies Seeking Contracts: Facing an
Uphill Battle in the EU, THE INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROF.: THE PRIVACY ADVISOR (May 20,
2014), https://iapp.org/news/a/safe-harbor-compliant-companies-seeking-contracts-facing-an-uph
ill-battle-i/.
7. Bowman, supra note 5.
8. Id.
9. See ALLEN & OVERY, THE EU GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION (2016),
http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Radical%20changes%20to%20European%
20data%20protection%20legislation.pdf.
10. See id. at 2.
11. See id.
12. Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter Commission
Regulation].
13. See ALLEN & OVERY, supra note 9, at 3.
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Further, the GDPR largely came about as a result of public debate around
how large technology companies handle personal data, and the practice of
domestic governments monitoring such data for investigative purposes. 14
Paradoxically, many of the U.S.-based companies that relied on Safe Harbor
were small and medium sized enterprises. 15 Accordingly, much uncertainty
remains with respect to how these small technology companies should
operationalize their data transfers in light of recent regulatory
developments. 16
Part I of this Note provides a brief historical overview of European data
privacy law and how it has traditionally differed from that of the United
States. Part II discusses the GDPR and what it will mean for companies
looking to compete in the global digital economy. Part III addresses the
current options in place for companies—both large and small—looking to
lawfully transfer personal data out of the European Union and into a third
country, and explains why these methods are not operationally feasible for
small ventures. Finally, Part IV proposes both a short-term and a long-term
solution. In the near-term, this Note proposes that Congress enact a federal
tax credit for small, U.S.-based companies looking to have a digital footprint
in the European Union. As a more lasting solution, this Note recommends
that Congress pass data privacy legislation to address growing privacy
concerns in the United States and abroad, and to streamline transatlantic data
transfers by bringing data protection laws in the United States to the level
observed in the European Union.
I. DATA PRIVACY LAW IN EUROPE
Privacy is seen as a fundamental right in Europe, and includes the right
to protection with respect to the processing of personal data. 17
Consequentially, European culture espouses a greater expectation of privacy
than what exists in the United States. 18 Traditionally, the law protecting this
14. See Glyn Moody, “Privacy Shield” Proposed to Replace US-EU Safe Harbor, Faces
Skepticism, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 29, 2016, 9:04 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/02
/privacy-shield-doomed-from-get-go-nsa-bulk-surveillance-waved-through/.
15. See Julie Brill, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’r, Two-Way Street: U.S.-EU Parallels Under the
General Data Protection Regulation, Keynote Address at Ghostery/Hogan Lovells Data Privacy Day
9 (Jan. 21, 2016) (transcript available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_sta
tements/910663/160121hoganghostery_dpd.pdf).
16. See U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework Before the H. Energy and Trade Subcomm. on Com,
Mfg. and Trade and Commerce & Tech. (Nov. 3, 2015) [hereinafter Testimony of Edward Dean]
(testimony of Edward M. Dean, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Serv., Int’l Trade Admin., U.S. Dep’t
of Commerce), available at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF16/20151103/104148/HHRG114-IF16-20151103-SD012.pdf.
17. See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 8/2014 on the Recent Developments
on the Internet of Things, at 3 (WP223) (Sept. 16, 2014).
18. See Phil Lee, How Do EU and US Privacy Regimes Compare? FIELDFISHER: PRIVACY,
SECURITY, AND INFO. L. (Mar. 5, 2014, 10:29 PM), http://privacylawblog.fieldfisher.com/2014/ho
w-do-eu-and-us-privacy-regimes-compare/.
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right in Europe was the 1995 Directive (the Directive). 19 Among other things,
the Directive forbade the transfer of personal data to a country outside the
European Economic Area (EEA) unless that country had adequate protection
measures in place. 20 Because of the stark difference in privacy protection
laws between Europe and the United States, European Data Protection
Authorities (DPA) deemed the United States’ laws to be inadequate. 21
While this may appear to have constituted a major obstacle to the
functioning of the global digital economy, the United States and the European
Union overcame this by forming the Safe Harbor Pact. 22 Under Safe Harbor,
American companies could self-certify that they complied with the Safe
Harbor data protection principles. 23 A self-certification essentially meant that
the company publically attested that it complied with certain European
privacy standards. 24 Once a company self-certified, it could transfer personal
data from the EEA to the United States without running afoul of the
Directive. 25 Safe Harbor, therefore, provided U.S.-based companies with a
relatively accessible method of ensuring compliance with the more stringent
privacy laws of the EEA while also enabling the continuous flow of personal
data from the EEA to the United States. 26 As of 2015, approximately 4,400
companies participated in the Safe Harbor. 27
In a single decision in 2015, the CJEU changed all of that. 28 In Schrems
v. Data Protection Commissioner, the CJEU ruled that national regulators in
the European Union had the authority to override the fifteen year-old
framework, as it violated the privacy rights of Europeans by exposing them
to unlawful surveillance by the U.S. government. 29 The case began in 2013
when Max Schrems, Austrian privacy advocate, filed a complaint regarding

19. See generally Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31.
20. See Bowman, supra note 5.
21. See Peter Sayer, EU Court Rules US Privacy Protection Inadequate, INFOWORLD (Oct. 6,
2015), http://www.infoworld.com/article/2988851/privacy/eu-court-rules-us-privacy-protectioninadequate.html.
22. See Bowman, supra note 5.
23. See id. These principles included notice, choice, onward transfer, security, data integrity,
access, and enforcement. See PRIVACYTRUST, SAFE HARBOR CERTIFICATION, https://www.privacy
trust.com/guidance/safe_harbor.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2017).
24. See Bowman, supra note 5.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. Testimony of Edward Dean, supra note 16. Dean described Safe Harbor as “a cornerstone
of the transatlantic digital economy enabling growth and innovation in the United States and in
Europe.” Id.
28. See generally Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R. 1-1, available at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=169195&doclang=EN.
29. See id.
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Facebook’s compliance with EU data privacy laws. 30 The complaint, filed
with the Irish Data Protection Commissioner (DPC), 31 claimed that
revelations brought to light by former NSA contractor, Edward Snowden,
showed that Facebook was not sufficiently protecting users’ data, since the
data was subject to mass surveillance in the United States. 32 Procedurally,
Mr. Schrems was venturing into uncharted territory. 33 The Irish DPC initially
rejected the complaint on grounds that it was bound by the Safe Harbor
Pact. 34 Mr. Schrems then appealed to an Irish Court, which requested an
answer from the CJEU on whether a national regulator had the authority to
disregard a pact that applies across the entire European Union. 35 The court
held that the Irish DPC not only had the authority to investigate, but that it
had a duty to do so. 36
The result was sweeping. 37 To Mr. Schrems, the decision was a victory
for privacy. 38 “The message is clear,” he said, “that mass surveillance isn’t
possible against fundamental rights in Europe.” 39 Experts disagree, however,
on the validity of the premise upon which the court’s decision relied.40
According to Edward M. Dean, former Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Services in the International Trade Administration of the Department of
Commerce, Safe Harbor was the unfortunate scapegoat of broader
geopolitical revelations with regard to surveillance. 41 Mr. Dean noted that
“[s]ince Safe Harbor had become linked to the surveillance disclosures, it
became a target for continued criticism largely based on misunderstanding
and false assumptions about its purpose and operation and the important
privacy benefits it provided.” 42 At the core of the criticism, Mr. Dean said,
were “false accusations that the United States was engaged in ‘mass,
indiscriminate surveillance’ of the data transferred to the United States under
Safe Harbor.” 43
Regardless of whether the criticism was well-founded, the implications
of the court’s decision were significant. 44 Billions of dollars of trade in the
online advertising industry relied upon Safe Harbor for its compliance with
30. See Natalia Drozdiak and Sam Schechner, EU Court Says Data-Transfer Pact with U.S.
Violates Privacy, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-court-strikes-downtrans-atlantic-safe-harbor-data-transfer-pact-1444121361.
31. Sayer, supra note 21.
32. Drozdiak & Schechner, supra note 30.
33. Sayer, supra note 21.
34. Drozdiak & Schechner, supra note 30.
35. Id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See Sayer, supra note 21.
39. Drozdiak & Schechner, supra note 30.
40. See Testimony of Edward Dean, supra note 16; see also Carson, supra note 6.
41. See Testimony of Edward Dean, supra note 16.
42. Id. at 2.
43. Id.
44. See Sayer, supra note 21; see also Drozdiak & Schechner, supra note 30.
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EU privacy law. 45 Furthermore, myriad companies relied on Safe Harbor
when transferring human-resource related data about European employees. 46
“Losing Safe Harbor would be hugely disruptive to all sorts of businesses,”
said one official at a U.S.-based technology company that provides cloud
services. 47 Similarly, former Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker
commented that “we are deeply disappointed in [the Safe Harbor decision],”
as it “puts at risk the thriving transatlantic digital economy.” 48
Many feel that the decision will hurt small businesses most, since they
do not have the legal resources necessary to adopt other data-transfer
methods, or defend against potential complaints that may stem from such
methods. 49 “We expect that a suspension of Safe Harbor will negatively
impact Europe’s economy, [and] hurt small and medium-sized enterprises,
and the consumers who use their services, the most,” said Christian
Borggreen, International Policy Director for the Computer &
Communications Industry Association. 50 Similarly, Mike Weston, CEO of
Data Science Consultancy Profusion, described the development as bad news
for small and medium-sized companies transferring data from the European
Union to the United States, as “American companies are going to have to
restructure how they manage, store and use data in Europe and this will take
a lot of time and money.” 51 Mr. Dean’s testimony before the House Energy
and Commerce Subcommittees on Commerce, Manufacturing and Trade and
Communications & Technology bolstered this sentiment. 52 Mr. Dean
described a specific instance in which a small enterprise was hurt by the
suspension of Safe Harbor:
A small company, which provides support services relevant to clinical
research trials, has already lost significant business across Europe. The
company’s clients are suspending and shutting down projects, while its EUbased main competitor has reached out to other existing clients
recommending they switch providers in light of the court ruling. 53

Cases like this raise the question of how a small, digitally-oriented, U.S.based enterprise can achieve a global footprint in light of these recent legal
developments.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Drozdiak & Schechner, supra note 30.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Sayer, supra note 21.
See Testimony of Edward Dean, supra note 16, at 3–4.
Id.
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II. THE GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION: AN
AGGRESSIVE STEP FORWARD FROM THE DIRECTIVE
After four years of discussion, the European Commission adopted the
GDPR. 54 The GDPR will replace the Directive when it goes into effect on
May 25, 2018. 55 Companies that process personal data would be wise to take
this time to review the GDPR in detail to ensure that their organizations are
prepared for the significant impact that the law will surely have. 56
The European Commission pushed the GDPR forward as an overall
update to EU data protection law for several reasons. 57 First, the GDPR will
provide an overall harmonization of data protection laws across the EEA. 58
Under the Directive, enforcement of data protection laws required local
implementation of national legislation by each individual member state. 59
Under the GDPR, the regulations will take immediate effect in each
individual member state, without the need for states to enact national
legislation. 60 This method of implementation will likely lead to a more
uniform, turnkey application of the GDPR across the EEA. 61 Along those
same lines, the GDPR will create a “One Stop Shop,” a term adopted by the
European Commission to describe an improvement to what proved to be a
frustrating component of the Directive. 62 Under the Directive, companies
could be subject to enforcement by any of the individual member state DPAs,
each of whom could have potentially taken a varying approach to
enforcement of the Directive and its principles. 63 With the GDPR, companies
will have a single supervisory authority based on the company’s location or,
if the company has multiple locations, its “main establishment.” 64 This will
likely reduce the headache and confusion companies experienced when
corresponding with DPAs across the EEA. 65
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly for companies, the GDPR
will have an extra-territorial effect. 66 Currently, under the Directive, data
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See ALLEN & OVERY, supra note 9, at 2.
Id.
See id. at 9.
See id. at 2.
See § 11:2 PROPOSED GEN. DATA PROTECTION REG., 2 DATA SEC. & PRIVACY LAW § 11:2
(Westlaw through 2017) [hereinafter PROPOSED DATA PROTECTION REG.].
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. See id. The idea is that companies will only have to correspond with one supervisory
authority, and this will be the supervisory authority in the member state in which the company has
its “main establishment.” The main establishment is wherever the most processing activities take
place. Id. at 2. For example, if a company stations the majority of its engineers in one location, this
will likely be the company’s main establishment.
65. See id.
66. Commission Regulation, supra note 12, at 32–33 (“Territorial scope”); see also PROPOSED
DATA PROTECTION REG., supra note 58.
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controllers that are established in the European Union or make use of data
processing equipment located in the European Union are subject to the data
protection laws of the Directive. 67 The GDPR, however, will apply to data
controllers and processors outside the European Union whose processing
activities relate to (1) the offering of goods or services to data subjects in the
European Union, or (2) the monitoring of their behavior in the European
Union. 68 The GDPR provides details with regard to what business activities
fall under this provision, stating that the offering of goods or services, in order
to be subject to the GDPR, must be more than simply providing access to a
website or email address. 69 Such goods or services might take the form of
using the language or currency generally used in one or more member states
with the possibility of purchasing goods or services there, or monitoring the
behavior of data subjects in member states. 70 Moreover, this monitoring of
behavior provision applies to situations in which data subjects are tracked on
the internet by methods that apply a profile to the subject in order to make
decisions and predictions about the subject’s personal preferences. 71 The
result will be that many non-EU businesses—and in particular internet
companies—will now be subject to the GDPR, a break from the current
situation under the Directive. 72 The GDPR, therefore, carries sweeping
implications for American companies of all sizes looking to process data
related to citizens in the EEA in 2018 and beyond. 73
The changes do not stop there. Not only will the GDPR claim jurisdiction
over thousands of non-EU companies, it will also impose a host of new
obligations on businesses. 74 First, the GDPR requires that companies
generally implement appropriate data protection policies. 75 The GDPR lays
out extremely detailed compliance requirements for both data controllers and
data processors, and mandates that companies take measures to demonstrate
compliance with the law. 76 Additionally, the GDPR introduces the concepts
of data protection “by design and by default.” 77 This obligates businesses to
incorporate privacy and data protection as part of the organization’s DNA
from the start of any product design process, maintain such an approach
throughout the processing activity’s life-cycle, and appropriately assess all
risks to data protection and privacy before launching new products. 78
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

PROPOSED DATA PROTECTION REG., supra note 58.
ALLEN & OVERY, supra note 9, at 3.
See Commission Regulation, supra note 12, at para. 23.
See id. at para. 24.
See ALLEN & OVERY, supra note 9, at 3; see also Commission Regulation, supra note 12.
See ALLEN & OVERY, supra note 9, at 3.
See Sayer, supra note 21.
See ALLEN & OVERY, supra note 9, at 3.
See Commission Regulation, supra note 12, at 47; see also PROPOSED DATA PROTECTION
REG., supra note 58.
76. See PROPOSED DATA PROTECTION REG., supra note 58.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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Notwithstanding the time that companies have to prepare for the GDPR, the
requirement to update fundamental approaches to product design is daunting,
time consuming, and expensive. 79 Roy Smith, the CEO of PrivacyCheq,
lamented that “the GDPR will be particularly hard on software-as-a-service 80
(SaaS) legacy products,” as they were “put in place without consideration of
privacy, encryption, user consent, [and the] right to be forgotten.” 81 The
effort required to update these products, Smith said, will be akin to that of
“changing an engine on a plane in midflight.” 82
Additionally, the GDPR will emphasize the concept of data minimization
and the principle of necessity. 83 These concepts will require companies to
establish and maintain adequate technical and organizational measures to
effectively ensure that, “by default, only personal data which are necessary
for each specific purpose of the processing are processed.” 84 Along similar
lines, the GDPR will also require organizations to maintain significant
internal records. 85 The GDPR puts forth a list of data that must be included
in these records which, in many cases, is more onerous than the previous
requirements for registration under the Directive. 86 Furthermore, the GDPR
will require that, in many cases, organizations appoint a Data Protection
Officer (DPO) to oversee data protection within the organization and manage
compliance with the relevant supervisory authority. 87 The GDPR will also
require that companies perform data protection impact assessments where the
processing is “likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms” of

79. See Sayer, supra note 21.
80. Software as a service (SaaS) simply refers to a method of providing programs over the

internet as a service. SaaS provides the benefit of simplicity and accessibility, since it frees
customers from dealing with complicated software and hardware. SaaS: Software as a Service,
SALESFORCE, https://www.salesforce.com/saas/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2017).
81. Ricci Dipshan, The GDPR Reckoning: How the Upcoming Regulation is Already Changing
Privacy in Tech, LEGAL TECH. NEWS (Sept. 21, 2016) https://www.law.com/legaltechnews/almID
/1202767963049/.
82. Id.
83. See Commission Regulation, supra note 12, at para. 156 (“[S]afeguards should ensure that
technical and organisational measures are in place in order to ensure, in particular, the principle of
data minimisation.”).
84. Id. at art. 25; see also PROPOSED DATA PROTECTION REG., supra note 58.
85. See Commission Regulation, supra note 12, at art. 57; see also PROPOSED DATA PROTECTI
ON REG., supra note 58.
86. See PROPOSED DATA PROTECTION REG., supra note 58.
87. See Commission Regulation, supra note 12, at arts. 37–39. Pursuant to Article 37, examples
of cases that require the appointment of a DPO include where “the core activities of the controller
or the processor consist of processing operations which, by virtue of their nature, their scope and/or
their purposes, require regular and systematic monitoring of data subjects on a large scale;” or “the
core activities of the controller or the processor consist of processing on a large scale of special
categories of data pursuant to Article 9 [governing the processing of personal data revealing racial
or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union members, and
the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural
person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation]
and personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences referred to in Article 10.”
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individuals, 88 and companies will be held directly liable under the GDPR for
the security of personal data processing activities. 89
Additionally, consent will become significantly more difficult to use as
a justification for processing personal data under the GDPR. 90 Companies
would be wise to review the GDPR’s language closely to ensure that the data
subject’s consent is specific, informed, and unambiguous. 91 Furthermore,
data controllers must be able to prove that they obtained the requisite consent,
and consent will not be valid under the GDPR if a significant imbalance
between the parties exists. 92 For example, such an imbalance may exist
between an employer and employee if there is an apparent disparity in
bargaining power. 93
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the GDPR will significantly
increase fines for violations of data protection laws. 94 Fines under the
Directive vary based on national law and tend to be relatively low. 95 For
example, the maximum fine under the Directive in the United Kingdom is
£500,000. 96 Under the GDPR, however, punishment will be uniform
throughout the EEA and maximum fines will increase substantially, with the
maximum fine increasing to €20 million, or 4% of annual worldwide
turnover, whichever is greater. 97
Given the significant changes to the European data privacy regime, as
well as the myriad new obligations under the GDPR, companies must take
88. See id. at art. 35. Article 35, para. 3 expounds on the meaning of “high risk to the rights and
freedoms of natural persons,” stating that:
A data protection impact assessment . . . shall in particular be required in the case of: (a)
a systematic and extensive evaluation of personal aspects relating to natural persons
which is based on automated processing, including profiling, and on which decisions are
based that produce legal effects concerning the natural person or similarly significantly
affect the natural person; (b) processing on a large scale of special categories of data
referred to in Article 9(1) [relating to personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin,
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the
processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a
natural person, data concerning health or a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation]
or of personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences referred to in Article 10;
or (c) a systematic monitoring of a publicly accessible area on a large scale.
Id.

89.
90.
91.
92.

See PROPOSED DATA PROTECTION REG., supra note 58.
See id.
See Commission Regulation, supra note 12, at para. 32.
See id. at paras. 42–43 (“the controller should be able to demonstrate that the data subject
has given consent to the processing operation. . . .” and “consent should not provide a valid legal
ground for the processing of personal data in a specific case where there is a clear imbalance
between the data subject and the controller. . . .”); see also PROPOSED DATA PROTECTION REG.,
supra note 58.
93. See PROPOSED DATA PROTECTION REG., supra note 58.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. Commission Regulation, supra note 12, at art. 83.

2017]

The GDPR and its Consequences

197

preparatory measures now to ensure they are able to comply. 98 For small,
U.S.-based enterprises that relied on Safe Harbor under the Directive, the
future of data privacy compliance in the European Union remains nebulous.
III. AVAILABLE OPTIONS FOR TRANSATLANTIC DATA
TRANSFER UNDER THE GDPR DO NOT ADEQUATELY
ADDRESS THE NEEDS OF SMALL COMPANIES
The enhanced territorial reach of the GDPR and the plethora of
obligations that will go into effect in 2018 will leave many U.S.-based
companies looking for legally sound methods of transferring data out of the
European Union. The GDPR allows companies to transfer data out of the
EEA if the data is moving to a country with data protection laws that are
deemed adequate by the European Commission. 99 The European
Commission has not declared the laws of the United States adequate. 100 The
result is that companies in the United States that are looking to transfer data
out of the EEA will need to transfer by way of appropriate safeguards, as
provided by Article 46 of the GDPR. 101 For various reasons, however, the
menu of available options for transferring personal data out of the EEA under
the GDPR are complex and expensive, and likely not operationally feasible
for most small enterprises, and thus the current landscape leaves these
companies in a bind. 102
A. CODES OF CONDUCT
First, companies can lawfully transfer data from the European Union to
a third-party country through adherence to an approved code of conduct. 103
To do so, the parties processing or controlling the data must submit to a
contract that governs the subject matter and duration of the data processing,
the purposes of the processing, and the type of data and categories of data
subjects. 104 The code must take into account the specific tasks and
responsibilities of the processor in the context of the processing to be carried
out and the risk for the rights and freedoms of the data subject. 105
98. See Dipshan, supra note 81.
99. See Anna Myers, Top 10 Operational Impacts of the GDPR: Part 4 – Cross-Border Data

Transfers, THE INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROF.: THE PRIVACY ADVISOR (Jan. 19, 2016), https://iap
p.org/news/a/top-10-operational-impacts-of-the-gdpr-part-4-cross-border-data-transfers/.
100. See Bowman, supra note 5.
101. See Myers, supra note 99.
102. FTC Commissioner Julie Brill acknowledged that Standard Contractual Clauses and Binding
Corporate Rules are each “expensive, complicated, and may not be appropriate for all data
transfers.” See Boris Segalis & Kathryn Linksy, FTC Commissioner Julie Brill Comments on EUUS Privacy Shield, DATA PROTECTION REP. (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.dataprotectionreport.com/2
016/02/ftc-commissioner-julie-brill-comments-on-eu-us-privacy-shield/.
103. See Myers, supra note 99.
104. See Commission Regulation, supra note 12, at para. 81.
105. See id.
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Although binding codes of conduct provide an alternate mechanism to
transfer data out of the EEA, utilizing this method is operationally
cumbersome. 106 The GDPR claims to take “account of the specific needs of
micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises,” 107 and yet, utilizing codes of
conduct as a method of transferring data under the GDPR requires companies
to appeal directly to supervisory authorities in EU member states. 108 The
supervisory authority then gives “an opinion on whether the draft code . . .
complies with [the] Regulation.” 109 This process could take years, according
to Harriet Pearson, a partner at the law firm Hogan Lovells and a former Chief
Privacy Officer for IBM. 110 Implicit in the inclusion of this mechanism is the
assumption that most codes of conduct will be drafted by trade associations
or other organizations representing data processors, and will be written with
the many aspects and obligations of the GDPR in mind. 111 Prominent industry
trade groups, however, tend to represent large technology companies and,
thus, binding codes of conduct as a mechanism for transatlantic data transfer
do not help small businesses, since they do not have the legal resources
necessary to adopt such an onerous method. 112
B. STANDARD CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES
A second option for an appropriate safeguard under the GDPR is the use
of standard data protection contractual clauses. 113 In essence, companies can
use contract language approved by the European Commission or a member
state DPA in order to transfer data out of an EU member state and into a
country lacking an adequacy status. 114 Companies looking to employ ad hoc
contractual clauses must obtain approval from the appropriate supervisory
authority prior to doing a deal, thereby making the mechanism less
operationally feasible. 115 Furthermore, former FTC Commissioner Julie Brill
acknowledged that standard contractual clauses are “expensive, complicated,
and may not be appropriate for all data transfers.” 116 For small businesses,
therefore, standard contractual clauses likely fall short of providing a feasible
method of data transfer.
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C. CERTIFICATION MECHANISMS
As another form of appropriate safeguard, the GDPR encourages the
“establishment of certification mechanisms, data protection seals and marks,”
such that data subjects are able to quickly assess the level of data protection
of relevant products and services. 117 Similar to codes of conduct and standard
contractual clauses, the implementation of certification mechanisms, seals,
and marks require additional action by the European Data Protection
Board. 118 In the future, the Board may develop a common European Data
Protection Seal and oversee the publishing of information about certification
registrants in a publically available directory. 119 Whether this type of action
happens, and whether it presents a viable method of certification, remains to
be seen.
Still, the United States and the European Union recently adopted the
Privacy Shield Framework in an effort to provide a new transatlantic data
transfer framework. 120 The European Commission adopted the arrangement
in an effort to “impose stronger obligations on U.S. companies exchanging
data with EU states” in the wake of the Safe Harbor invalidation. 121 While at
face value the agreement appears to serve as a replacement for Safe Harbor
and, therefore, allow for uninterrupted data flows, analysts and industry
officials are not convinced. 122 Datacenter Dynamics described the agreement
as “controversial” and suggested that it would be the subject of further
appeals and subsequent revisions. 123 Similarly, Julie Brill acknowledged that
with Privacy Shield, there is much conversation around “whether European
courts, Member States, and data protection authorities will find the
protections surrounding these data transfers to be adequate.” 124 The viability
of Privacy Shield as a framework for transatlantic data transfer is thus
clouded by uncertainty, with experts doubting its longevity, and one
concluding that it will “suffer the same fate as the Safe Harbor scheme it has
been designed to replace.” 125 Accordingly, without additional legal clarity,
the recently adopted framework does not provide small businesses with a
reliable mechanism for data transfer.
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D. HOW DO LARGE TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES COMPLY?
It is worth noting that large technology companies based in the United
States can comply with the GDPR by simply keeping their data within the
EEA, thereby negating the need for use of the aforementioned appropriate
safeguards. 126 The resources available to these industry-leading companies
enable them to comply by relocating their data centers to the EEA, or building
new ones, which they are doing. 127 For example, Apple, Microsoft, and
Google are investing in Irish, Dutch, and Scandinavian facilities, and, in
general, large U.S. providers and enterprises are bolstering their presence
closer to their data subjects across the Atlantic. 128 Google also expanded the
size of its center in Belgium, and built a new data center in the Netherlands. 129
Moreover, Amazon plans to add a new data center in Sweden in 2018, giving
Amazon a total of five cloud services locations in Europe. 130 Amazon’s
founder and CEO, Jeff Bezos, also met with the Italian Prime Minister,
Matteo Renzi, in July of 2016 to discuss opportunities in Italy. 131 This
interaction sheds light on the recent trend of politicizing the construction of
data centers, a pattern that could increase with the evolution of data protection
regulation, coupled with the obvious incentives for political figures to attract
technology investment to their countries. 132 And while it may be easy to see
why large U.S. technology companies would look to invest in data centers
across the EEA and ingratiate themselves with relevant political figures, this
movement clouds the landscape for small businesses in the evolving digital
economy. 133
Indeed, small, U.S.-based technology companies looking to compete
across the EEA are currently caught “between a rock and a hard place.”134
Purely from an operational perspective, the obligations placed on companies
by the GDPR are extensive. 135 According to Ryan Costello, operations
manager at eTERA Consulting in Europe, the GDPR will require that many
companies conduct “a complete revamping of their software, which small
companies don’t have the resources or time to be able to do.” 136 This is the
case, Mr. Costello explained, because these companies may have expended
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all their capital and effort creating a specific product. 137 Mr. Costello believes
that while most of the large and midsized companies will be able to meet the
regulation by 2018, “small companies are the ones that will get hurt the
most.” 138 Indeed, many companies may find that the burden of complying
with the new data protection regulations by 2018 will simply be too much of
a burden to bear. According to former FTC Commissioner Julie Brill, “small
and medium enterprises—which made up around 60 percent of Safe Harbor
membership—stand to lose the most from the Schrems decision.” 139 Ms. Brill
explained that, similar to the biggest companies that are frequently the subject
of public debates in Europe, small and medium-sized enterprises depend on
the free flow of information to sell goods and services globally, to build
global workforces, and to take advantage of low-cost cloud computing
resources. 140 Unlike those big technology companies, these small and
medium enterprises “do not have the resources to get [binding corporate
rules] approved or put model contractual clauses in place.” 141 The result:
these small ventures are left in a bind.
IV. ADDRESSING THE PREDICAMENT THAT SMALL, U.S.
INTERNET COMPANIES FACE IN THE GDPR WORLD
The GDPR, as described above, will provide a unified, harmonized body
of data protection laws that align with Europe’s comparatively stringent
views of data privacy. Given the progression of technology and data
processing, however, the GDPR’s principles leave a wide gap between the
state of digital commerce today and the world the Commission envisions.
With the GDPR, Europe will enhance its data privacy regime to a point which
will require data processors to reexamine their approaches to product design
and overall operations. 142 This happens at a time when thousands of non-EU
companies are left without a good option for transferring personal data out of
the European Union as part of their operations. 143
With no Safe Harbor, and a more onerous European data privacy regime,
the transatlantic digital economy is likely headed toward a business climate
in which very few small, U.S.-based companies are able to comply with EU
law. 144 It is also worth noting that many business leaders are currently
unaware of the requirements that the new regulation will impose on their
organizations. 145 A recent study by Amárach Research, completed on behalf
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of BT Ireland, revealed that “63 percent [of financial decision makers
working in organizations with an average of 800 employees] were unaware
of the requirements or penalties associated with the EU’s General Data
Protection Regulation.” 146 Additionally, the report revealed that, despite Irish
Chief Financial Officers (CFO) being more likely than Chief Information
Officers to be in control of large-scale IT investments, approximately twothirds of the CFOs surveyed were completely unaware of key privacy
regulations, such as Privacy Shield. 147 This report puts the current regulatory
landscape in perspective, as it underscores the question recently posed by BT
Communications Ireland Managing Director Shay Walsh: “[A]re boardroom
decision makers aware of the penalties associated with a data breach?”148
Walsh emphasized that CFOs and board members “need to understand the
impact of their tech spend, and ensure they have clear procedures, policies
and compliance in place, in preparation for the changes coming in May
2018.” 149
Looking ahead, the regulatory landscape under the GDPR could go one
of two ways. On the one hand, the climate could be one in which few
companies comply, and consistent enforcement across the EEA of all data
protection infringements is a pipe dream. On the other hand, the situation
could be one in which European DPAs significantly increase enforcement of
data protection infringements to an extent that could seriously jeopardize
U.S.-based companies’ ability to compete throughout the EEA. For small
American companies, the latter scenario is not optimal, and it bears noting
that U.S.-based companies will, in theory, be the ones falling behind.
Companies based in the EEA will benefit from a streamlined approach to data
privacy enforcement and compliance. 150 Such regulatory renovations may, in
time, prove beneficial for companies in the European Union, a result the
European Commission is undoubtedly counting on. Indeed, with the
Commission creating a “One Stop Shop” mechanism to harmonize
enforcement of the GDPR, 151 the hope is that imposing an extra-territorial
effect will raise the data privacy standards globally. 152
Evidence of this can already be found in various pockets of the world.
For example, in the Philippines, one Senator who authored a recently enacted
data protection law cited business and investment interests as a primary
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motivator for basing the law on the EU Data Protection Directive. 153 “By
establishing such a policy framework, we actually protect Internet freedoms
while making sure the Web remains safe,” the Senator explained. 154 “In this
way, we reduce the risk for true harm to be inflicted and heighten the
opportunity for our digital space to be a truly productive and collaborative
venue.” 155 The Philippines’ government thus hoped to encourage investment
in their information technology and Business Process Outsourcing (BPO)
industries by mimicking the privacy framework of the European Union. 156
This development lends credence to the idea that the European Union will
raise global data protection standards by enacting the GDPR.
By not passing data privacy legislation, the United States risks falling
behind the global standard for data privacy and further eroding citizens’ trust
in the processing of personal data by U.S.-based companies. Despite
conversations amongst top officials in the United States and the European
Union being described as “healthy talks about U.S. efforts to make ongoing
improvements to the framework,” 157 the United States and the European
Union are clearly at a crossroads. While the European Union just passed a
sweeping regulation that will empower citizens to better understand and
control their personal data while also providing a streamlined mechanism of
enforcement, the United States is essentially in the same place it was when
Safe Harbor was invalidated. Indeed, “the EU in general still strongly
mistrusts the U.S. to keep its data safe.” 158 Even prior to Safe Harbor’s
invalidation, the issue of trust seemed to have an effect both on individual
citizens’ choices as well as those of European companies. Not surprisingly,
the two appear to be inextricably linked. Emmannuelle Bartoli, former Chief
Privacy and Security Legal Counsel at Atos in Paris, described the market for
data transfer from Europe to the United States as “very tough because the
customers are always questioning the security . . . . Self-certification in
Europe is not something people trust.” 159
On the other hand, some experts feel the attitudes around the prior selfcertification regime are unwarranted. Phil Lee, Certified Information Privacy
Professional (Europe)(CIPP/E) of Field Fisher Waterhouse, described Safe
Harbor as the “low-hanging fruit,” because the framework was a “little
unfairly singled out.” 160 Mr. Lee explained that “[o]f all the data-export
solutions, the most enforcement has happened around Safe Harbor.” 161
153. See Senate Approves Data Privacy Act on 3rd Reading, ABS-CBN NEWS (Mar. 20, 2012),
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Furthermore, Mr. Lee pointed out that there had been “no enforcement of
model [contract] breaches, no enforcement of binding corporate rules
breaches.” 162 Mr. Lee concluded that, “in many senses, Safe Harbor is the
most robustly enforced.” 163 To that end, the FTC had shown a willingness to
enforce data privacy prior to Safe Harbor’s invalidation. 164 Indeed, between
November 2013—when the European Commission published thirteen
recommendations for how to improve Safe Harbor—and May 2014, the FTC
reached settlements with more than twelve companies regarding alleged
infringements related to Safe Harbor. 165
Such a push in enforcement actions could be seen as a genuine attempt
by the FTC—and the United States in general—to ramp up their privacy
enforcement regime, thereby pushing the standard closer to that of the
European Union. On the other hand, it could also be seen as a desperate
attempt to salvage the only legal framework for transatlantic data flow that
U.S. companies utilized on a widespread basis. The continuing distrust on the
part of the European Union seems to suggest the latter. Mr. Lee described a
conversation he had with a German company which, at the time, was in
discussions with a U.S.-based vendor. 166 Mr. Lee, with hopes of facilitating
a deal, tried to persuade the German company that the U.S. company had
done its due diligence, and that Safe Harbor was the optimal legal solution
upon which to base the deal. 167 The German company responded, “[T]hat
may be the case, but it’s not safe.” 168 Further, the German company explained
that while they recognized everything Lee was saying, they simply did not
“like it at the end of the day.” 169 To Mr. Lee, this reaction showed that the
“emotional perception” of the United States’ privacy approach was
ultimately driving the decisions around whether those who were selfcertifying were adequately protecting data privacy. 170
A. SHORT-TERM SOLUTION: FEDERAL TAX CREDIT FOR SMALL
INTERNET BUSINESSES
Aside from the alleged merits of EU citizens’ distrust toward U.S.
privacy laws, the misgivings certainly seem to stem from the Snowden
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revelations. 171 As Mr. Dean of the Department of Commerce testified, Safe
Harbor originally became a target for criticism because it “had become linked
to the surveillance disclosures.” 172 Whether this link was valid or not, the
revelations brought to light by Snowden created distrust across the European
Union and the overall perception that the United States was “engaged in
‘mass, indiscriminate surveillance’” of personal data of EU citizens. 173
Indeed, “Mr. Schrems’ claimed allegations . . . by Snowden showed
Facebook wasn’t sufficiently protecting users’ data because it is subject to
mass surveillance in the U.S.” 174 The NSA’s surveillance practices, therefore,
played a significant role in producing the predicament that small, U.S.-based
internet companies looking to compete across the Atlantic now face. Without
the revelations regarding the surveillance of personal data, particularly the
personal data of non-U.S. citizens derived from large internet and social
network companies, EU citizens would have less of a reason to distrust the
United States, and small, U.S.-based internet companies would face fewer
obstacles when transferring data. Although the events likely will not pose
prohibitive obstacles for companies like Amazon or Facebook, small
enterprises are left searching for practical solutions, or perhaps not even
concerning themselves with compliance in the first place. To address this
predicament, Congress should adopt short-term measures to help small, U.S.based internet companies expand globally in a regulatory climate that,
practically speaking, discourages such growth.
Such legislative measures could take the form of a federal tax credit made
available to small internet companies that previously relied on Safe Harbor
for their transatlantic data transfers, as well as new companies that fit a
similar description. The credit would, in theory, help level the playing field
for U.S.-based internet companies. Requirements for obtaining approval for
the credit would include: (1) that the company employs less than 300
employees; (2) that the company’s annual revenue is under $7.5 million; 175
(3) that the processing of personal data of EU citizens is substantially related
to the functioning of the company’s business; (4) that the company does not
already belong to a trade or industry group that could implement binding
corporate codes of conduct or standard contractual clauses; and (5) that the
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company has previously complied and will continue to comply with the
privacy standards promulgated by the FTC.
With the credit program, Congress could maintain its own form of annual
certification. Under such a program, companies would work with the FTC to
apply annually for certification. As long as organizations remain in the small
enterprise category, maintain an internet-based business that relies on data
processing in order to function, and comply with the relevant data privacy
and data protection standards set forth by the FTC, companies would remain
in good standing and continue to benefit from the tax credit. The program
would help small companies like the one Mr. Dean described, 176 as the
financial assistance would enable them to either invest in data centers abroad
or partner with appropriate cloud computing vendors in the European Union.
The former route would enable small companies to more easily comply with
the GDPR, as they could avoid transfers of personal data to third-party
countries outside of the EEA. The latter option would achieve a similar result
in that it would enable small companies to keep any data they collect within
the confines of the EEA. This option could also prove beneficial for small
companies in that a sophisticated cloud computing partner would likely bring
compliance expertise to the company’s data processing activities. By helping
small companies afford a partnership with this type of vendor, the tax credit
would, to some extent, level the playing field with the larger technology
companies that already have the means to invest in data centers abroad.
B. LONG-TERM SOLUTION: FEDERAL DATA PRIVACY &
PROTECTION LEGISLATION
If the United States wants its businesses to compete globally, the
government needs a long-term solution. While the above tax credit would do
much to help remedy the predicament largely created by the U.S. government
itself, a more sustainable privacy framework that allows for seamless data
transfers across borders is optimal. To that end, Congress should enact
legislation that raises the data privacy standards in the United States, assuages
the concerns of foreign nations regarding data protection, and ultimately
earns the United States an “adequate” label from the European Commission.
1. The 2012 Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights: A Worthy
Model with Similarities to the GDPR
Congress should look to the 2012 Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights,
released by the Obama administration, as a useful framework for such
legislation. 177 The overall goal of the initiative was to strike the ideal balance
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between strengthening consumer protections with respect to data privacy and
allowing companies to innovate effectively both in the operation of their
businesses and in the implementation of privacy protection. 178 Along those
lines, President Obama described the importance of enhanced privacy
protection when he said that:
Even though we live in a world in which we share personal information
more freely than in the past, we must reject the conclusion that privacy is
an outmoded value. It has been at the heart of our democracy from its
inception, and we need it now more than ever. 179

The Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights outlined seven key rights that an
enhanced privacy framework should emphasize. 180 The guidelines pertain to
the relevant consumers, as well as the companies that process the data as part
of their business operations. 181 Not surprisingly, the seven-point framework
and the framework provided by the GDPR have plenty in common. The key
points are: (1) individual control; (2) transparency; (3) respect for context;
(4) security; (5) access and accuracy; (6) focused collection; and (7)
accountability. 182
The enhanced privacy framework would give individual consumers more
control over their personal data. Specifically, it would empower citizens to
control what data is collected, what is stored, and how it is used. 183 This
measure is not unlike the GDPR provisions requiring companies to account
for the right to correct and the right to be forgotten. 184 Next, the Consumer
Privacy Bill of Rights would impose the concept of transparency on digital
companies. 185 This would require companies to provide consumers with an
easy and accessible way of viewing the types of data collected and the
purposes of collection, a timeline of data processing, and whether their data
would ever be shared with third parties. 186 These concepts almost directly
mirror the GDPR’s transparency obligations outlined in Article 12. 187
The third component would require that companies only process personal
data in ways that are “consistent with both the relationship that they have
with consumers and the context in which consumers originally disclosed the
(2012), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf [hereinafter
Consumer Data Privacy].
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data . . . .” 188 Here, again, the proposed framework is consistent with the
GDPR’s requirements in Article 40 discussing data minimization and
restricting data processing to the purpose of its original collection. 189 This
component of the framework would, therefore, move the United States closer
to the European Union’s privacy standard.
The fourth component of the framework pertains to data protection.190
Companies would be required to implement adequate procedures to
safeguard against data breaches, data loss, data destruction, data
modification, and improper disclosure. 191 These concepts are reminiscent of
the GDPR’s requirement of data protection “by design and by default.” 192
Both privacy regimes would, therefore, require companies to incorporate
appropriate procedures—throughout both the product design life-cycle, as
well as the overall operation of the business—to ensure adequate data
security.
The framework would next require that companies provide consumers
with access—in usable formats—to their data so that they can correct any
inaccuracies. 193 The format must be easily digestible, and it must provide an
appropriate manner of correcting, deleting, or limiting the use of such data.
Moreover, companies must consider the “scale, scope, and sensitivity of the
personal data that they collect or maintain and the likelihood that its use may
expose consumers to financial, physical, or other material harm.” 194 Again,
the concern around inaccuracies and their potential impact on citizens’ lives
is something expressly contemplated by the GDPR in paragraph 71. 195 In this
sense, the two regimes express clear concern for the potentially
discriminatory effects of data processing and present rules to which
companies must adhere.
The sixth element in the proposed framework pertains to the “reasonable
limits on the personal data that companies collect and retain.” 196 This
proposed framework bears similarities with the GDPR’s principles of data
minimization and data by necessity. Under each, companies should not
collect excessive amounts of data, but rather collect the minimum amount of
data consistent with the context principle. 197 Finally, the Consumer Privacy
Bill of Rights would require accountability, which obligates companies to
properly train their employees, regularly evaluate their data privacy and
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protection procedures, and where appropriate, perform audits. 198 This would
encourage a similar standard imposed by the GDPR, which requires
companies to maintain adequate internal records, 199 implement adequate
organizational procedures, 200 and, in some cases, conduct data protection
impact assessments to ensure the proper standard of data privacy and
security. 201
2. Putting Federal Data Privacy Legislation in Context
Similarities notwithstanding, this framework is still not law. In 2012,
President Obama promised that his administration would “work to advance
these principles and work with Congress to put them into law.” 202 Five years
and a new administration later, the United States is without Safe Harbor, has
not formally enacted data privacy legislation, and relies primarily on Privacy
Shield—a framework that many feel will be invalidated—for cross-border
transfers. Moreover, in early 2016, the Obama administration moved to
expand the sharing of data that the NSA collects with other agencies. 203 The
administration had the authority to take such measures under domestic law
because the NSA collects the data through surveillance methods that
Congress did not include in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),
the main law governing wiretapping. 204 In the absence of express statutory
limits, the NSA’s surveillance programs are primarily governed by rules set
by the White House under a previous Executive Order. 205 Such a move will
likely further erode trust of U.S. data protection policy in the European Union
and around the globe. Such unfettered discretion is precisely what gave rise
to the high level of distrust in the first place and, therefore, must be checked.
To that end, the much-needed federal data privacy legislation should
explicitly codify the boundaries of the NSA’s surveillance authority, both in
terms of the personal data of Americans and that of foreign citizens. With
due consideration to the concerns of national security, the legislation could
mimic some of the language of the GDPR in terms of data minimization,
necessity, and appropriate safeguards. Specifically, the legislation should
require “appropriate technical and organizational measures . . . to safeguard

198.
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200.
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See Consumer Data Privacy, supra note 177, at 48.
See Commission Regulation, supra note 12, at art. 30.
See Commission Regulation, supra note 12, at arts. 5 and 22.
See Commission Regulation, supra note 12, at art. 35.
Rotenberg & Jacobs, supra note 152, at 652.
See Charlie Savage, Obama Administration Set to Expand Sharing of Data That N.S.A.
Intercepts, N.Y. TIMES (Feb 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/26/us/politics/obamaadministration-set-to-expand-sharing-of-data-that-nsa-intercepts.html.
204. See id.
205. Executive Order 12333, a directive from President Reagan’s administration, governs the
NSA’s surveillance programs that are not implicated by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
See id.

210

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 12

the rights and freedoms of the data subject.” 206 Lawmakers could achieve this
by explicitly specifying the purposes for which the agency could monitor
data, setting limits on the amount of time that data could be stored, and by
codifying the technical and organizational measures that would ensure that
fundamental rights, such as privacy, are not abused. Such legislation would
do much in the way of bringing U.S. surveillance practices out of the shadows
and instilling trust throughout the international community.
Such comprehensive legislation would dramatically update the data
privacy and data protection laws in the United States. This move forward for
the United States would bode well for transatlantic data transfers and the
digital economy overall. In the context of the European Union, this
legislation would put the United States in a position to earn an adequacy
categorization from the European Commission. Having an adequacy
categorization would effectively free up small, U.S.-based internet
companies to transfer data across borders with ease, thereby presenting a
solution to the problem that the government played a key role in creating.
Privacy legislation would also provide consumers—both in the European
Union and the United States—with increased confidence that their data is
being processed safely and responsibly. Moreover, such legislation would be
an important step toward securing the more than $240 billion in digitally
deliverable services traded between the United States and Europe. 207
Accordingly, Congress should promptly enact such legislation.
CONCLUSION
Revelations regarding the NSA’s surveillance practices shed light on the
risks to privacy in a digital world unchecked by proper privacy law. These
revelations sowed distrust around the world with respect to the treatment of
personal data in the United States. Europe’s treatment of data privacy as a
fundamental right separates it from the United States and positions the
European Union as a leader in the realm of data protection law in the digital
economy. With the GDPR taking effect in May 2018, companies around the
globe need to be aware of the upcoming changes, and take measures to ensure
compliance with the GDPR if they want to compete globally. Given the
severe penalties associated with data protection infringements under the
GDPR, ignoring the sweeping regulation would be a grave mistake. And
while it may be operationally feasible for large American technology
companies to comply right away, small, U.S.-based ventures face a
challenging road ahead.
The process of adjusting to the GDPR world will surely be iterative and
gradual, but given its massive scope, the U.S. government surely has a role
to play. Moreover, because the U.S. government was at least partly
206. Commission Regulation, supra note 12, at art. 5(1)(e).
207. See Testimony of Edward Dean, supra note 16.
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responsible for producing the aforementioned distrust amongst the
international community, Congress should be proactive about addressing the
inequities that small, U.S.-based companies currently face. Congress should
adopt both short-term and long-term measures to level the playing field for
small businesses in the United States. In the short term, Congress should
enact a federal tax credit containing an annual certification mechanism to
assist small, U.S.-based internet companies seeking a global footprint. In the
long run, Congress should pass federal data privacy legislation that raises the
data privacy and protection standards in the United States, assuages the
concerns of foreign nations regarding treatment of personal data in the United
States, and ultimately positions the United States to earn an adequacy ruling
from the European Commission. These measures would mitigate the
challenges many small American companies currently face, thereby helping
them compete in the global economy, and in the GDPR world.
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